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Abstract
The goal of this paper is to analyze the geometric properties of deep neural network classifiers in the input space. We
specifically study the topology of classification regions created by deep networks, as well as their associated decision boundary.
Through a systematic empirical investigation, we show that state-of-the-art deep nets learn connected classification regions, and that
the decision boundary in the vicinity of datapoints is flat along most directions. We further draw an essential connection between
two seemingly unrelated properties of deep networks: their sensitivity to additive perturbations in the inputs, and the curvature of
their decision boundary. The directions where the decision boundary is curved in fact characterize the directions to which the
classifier is the most vulnerable. We finally leverage a fundamental asymmetry in the curvature of the decision boundary of deep
nets, and propose a method to discriminate between original images, and images perturbed with small adversarial examples. We
show the effectiveness of this purely geometric approach for detecting small adversarial perturbations in images, and for recovering
the labels of perturbed images.
I. INTRODUCTION
While the geometry of classification regions and decision functions induced by traditional classifiers (such as linear and
kernel SVM) is fairly well understood, these fundamental geometric properties are to a large extent unknown for state-of-the-art
deep neural networks. Yet, to understand the recent success of deep neural networks and potentially address their weaknesses
(such as their instability to perturbations [1]), an understanding of these geometric properties remains primordial. While many
fundamental properties of deep networks have recently been studied, such as their optimization landscape in [2], [3], their
generalization in [4], [5], and their expressivity in [6], [7], the geometric properties of the decision boundary and classification
regions of deep networks has comparatively received little attention. The goal of this paper is to analyze these properties, and
leverage them to improve the robustness of such classifiers to perturbations.
In this paper, we specifically view classification regions as topological spaces, and decision boundaries as hypersurfaces and
examine their geometric properties. We first study the classification regions induced by state-of-the-art deep networks, and
provide empirical evidence suggesting that these classification regions are connected; that is, there exists a continuous path that
remains in the region between any two points of the same label. Up to our knowledge, this represents the first instance where
the connectivity of classification regions is empirically shown. Then, to study the complexity of the functions learned by the
deep network, we analyze the curvature of their decision boundary. We empirically show that
• The decision boundary in the vicinity of natural images is flat in most directions, with only a very few directions that are
significantly curved.
• We reveal the existence of a fundamental asymmetry in the decision boundary of deep networks, whereby the decision
boundary (near natural images) is biased towards negative curvatures.
• Directions with curved decision boundaries are shared between different datapoints.
• We demonstrate the existence of a relation between the sensitivity of a classifier to perturbations of the inputs, and these
shared directions: a deep net is vulnerable to perturbations along these directions, and is insensitive to perturbations along
the remaining directions.
We finally leverage the fundamental asymmetry of deep networks revealed in our analysis, and propose an algorithm to detect
natural images from imperceptibly similar images with very small adversarial perturbations [1], as well as estimate the correct
label of these perturbed samples. We show that our purely geometric characterization of (small) adversarial examples is very
effective to recognize perturbed samples.
Related works. In [8], the authors employ tools from Riemannian geometry to study the expressivity of random deep
neural networks. In particular, the largest principal curvatures are shown to increase exponentially with the depth; the decision
boundaries hence become more complex with depth. We provide in this paper a complementary and more global analysis of
the decision boundary, where the curvature of the decision boundary along all directions are analyzed. The authors of [9] show
that the number of linear regions (in the input space) of deep networks grow exponentially with the number of layers. Note
also that unlike [2], [3], [10], [11] that study the geometry of the optimization function in the weight space, we focus here
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Fig. 1: (a) Disconnected versus connected yet complex classification regions. (b) All four images are classified as puma. There
exists a path between two images classified with the same label.
on geometric properties in the input space. Finally, we note that graph-based techniques have been proposed in [12], [13] to
analyze the classification regions of shallow neural networks; we focus here on the new generation of deep neural networks,
which have shown remarkable performance.
II. DEFINITIONS AND NOTATIONS
Let f : Rd → RL denote a L class classifier. Given a datapoint x0 ∈ Rd, the estimated label is obtained by kˆ(x0) =
argmaxk fk(x0), where fk(x) is the k
th component of f(x) that corresponds to the kth class. The classifier f partitions the
space Rd into classification regions R1, . . . ,RL of constant label. That is, for any x ∈ Ri, kˆ(x) = i. For a neighboring class j,
the pairwise decision boundary of the classifier (between these two classes i and j) is defined as the set B = { z : F (z) = 0},
where F (z) = fi(z)− fj(z) (we omit dependence on i,j for simplicity). The decision boundary defines a hypersurface (of
dimension d− 1) in the Rd. Note that for any point on the decision boundary z ∈ B, the gradient ∇F (z) is orthogonal to the
tangent space Tz(B) of B at z.
In this paper, we are interested in studying the decision boundary of a deep neural network in the vicinity of natural images.
To do so, for a given point x, we define the mapping r(x), given by r(x) = argminr∈Rd ‖r‖2 subject to kˆ(x+ r) 6= kˆ(x),
which corresponds to the smallest perturbation required to misclassify image x. Note that r(x) corresponds geometrically
to the vector of minimal norm required to reach the decision boundary of the classifier, and is often dubbed an adversarial
perturbation [1]. It should further be noted that, due to simple optimality conditions, r(x) is orthogonal to the decision boundary
at x+ r(x).
In the remainder of this paper, our goal is to analyze the geometric properties of classification regions and decision boundaries
of deep networks. In particular, we study the connectedness of classification regions in Sec. III, and the curvature of decision
boundaries in Sec. IV, and draw a connection with the robustness of classifiers. We then use the developed geometric insights,
and propose a method in Sec. V to detect artificially perturbed data points, and improve the robustness of classifiers.
III. TOPOLOGY OF CLASSIFICATION REGIONS
Do deep networks create shattered and disconnected classification regions, or on the contrary, one large connected region per
label (see Fig. 1a)? While deep neural networks have an exponential number of linear regions (with respect to the number
of layers) in the input space [9], it remains unclear whether deep nets create one connected region per class, or shatters
a classification region around a large number of small connected sets. We formally cast the problem of connectivity of
classification regions as follows: given any two data points x1,x2 ∈ Ri, does a continuous curve γ : [0, 1]→ Ri exist, such
that γ(0) = x1, γ(1) = x2? The problem is complex to address theoretically; we therefore propose a heuristic method to study
this question.
To assess the connectivity of regions, we propose a path finding algorithm between two points belonging to the same
classification region. That is, given two points x1,x2 ∈ Rd, our proposed approach attempts to construct a piecewise linear path P
that remains in the classification region. The path P is represented as a finite set of anchor points (p0 = x1,p1, . . . ,pn,pn+1 =
x2), where a convex path is taken between two consecutive points. To find the path (i.e., the anchor points), the algorithm first
attempts to take a convex path between x1 and x2; when the path is not entirely included in the classification region, the path
is modified by projecting the midpoint p = (x1 + x2)/2 onto the target classification region. The same procedure is applied
3Algorithm 1 Finding a path between two data points.
1: function FINDPATH(x1,x2)
2: // input: Datapoints x1,x2 ∈ Rd.
3: // output: Path P represented by a set of anchor points. (A convex path is taken between two any anchor point).
4: xm ← (x1 + x2)/2
5: if kˆ(xm) 6= kˆ(x1) then
6: r ← argminr ‖r‖2 s.t. kˆ(xm + r) = kˆ(x1)
7: xm ← xm + r
8: end if
9: P ← (x1,xm,x2)
10: // Check the validity of the path by sampling in the convex combinations of consecutive anchor points, and check
whether the sampled points belong to region kˆ(x1).
11: if P is a valid path then
12: return P
13: end if
14: P1 ←FINDPATH(x1,xm)
15: P2 ←FINDPATH(xm,x2)
16: P ← concat(P1,P2)
17: return P
18: end function
recursively on the two segments of the path (x1,p) and (x2,p) till the whole path is entirely in the region. The algorithm is
summarized in Algorithm 1.
We now use the proposed approach to assess the connectivity of the CaffeNet architecture [14] on the ImageNet classification
task. To do so, we examine the existence of paths between
1) Two randomly sampled points from the validation set with the same estimated label,
2) A randomly sampled point from the validation set, and an adversarially perturbed image [1]. That is, we consider x1 to be
an image from the validation set, and x2 = x˜2 + r, where x˜2 corresponds to an image classified differently than x1. x2
is however classified similarly as x1, due to the targeted perturbation r.
3) A randomly sampled point from the validation set, and a perturbed random point. This is similar to scenario 2, but x˜2
is set to be a random image (i.e., an image sampled uniformly at random from the sphere ρSd−1, where ρ denotes the
typical norm of images).
Note that in scenario 2 and 3, x2 does not visually correspond to an image of the same class of x1 (but is classified by the
network as so). These scenarios are illustrated in Fig. 1b. For each scenario, 1,000 pairs of points are considered, and the
approach described above is used to find the path. Our result can be stated as follows:
In all three scenarios, a continuous path always exists between points sampled from the same classification region.
x1x2x1x2
Fig. 2: Classification regions (shown with different colors), and illustration of different paths between images x1, x2. Left:
The convex path between two datapoints might not be entirely included in the classification region (note that the linear path
traverses 4 other regions). The image is the cross-section spanned by r(x1) (adversarial perturbation of x1) and x1−x2. Right:
Illustration of a nonconvex path that remains in the classification region. The image is obtained by stitching cross-sections
spanned by r(x1) and pi − pi+1 (two consecutive anchor points in the path P).
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Fig. 3: Empirical probability (y axis) that a convex combination of k samples (x axis) from the same classification region
stays in the classification region, for networks trained on ImageNet. Samples are randomly chosen from the validation set.
This result suggests that the classification regions created by deep neural networks are connected in Rd: deep nets create
single large regions containing all points of the same label. More than that, the path that was found using the proposed
path finding approach approximately corresponds to a straight path. An illustration of the path between two images from the
validation set (i.e. scenario 1) is provided in Fig. 2.
Interestingly, when the endpoints are two randomly sampled images from the validation set, the straight path between the
two endpoints overwhelmingly belong to the classification region. However, classification regions are not convex bodies in
Rd. Fig. 3 illustrates the estimated probability that random convex combinations of k images x1, . . . ,xk ∈ Ri belong to Ri.
Observe that while convex combinations of two samples in a region are very likely (with probability ≈ 80%) to belong to the
same region, convex combinations of ≥ 5 samples do not usually belong to the same region.
Our experimental results therefore suggest that deep neural networks create large connected classification regions, where any
two points in the region are connected by a path.
In the next section, we explore the complexity of the boundaries of these classification regions learned by deep networks,
through their curvature property.
IV. CURVATURE OF THE DECISION BOUNDARIES
We start with basic definitions of curvature. The normal curvature κ(z,v) along a tangent direction v ∈ Tz(B) is defined
as the curvature of the planar curve resulting from the cross-section of B along the two-dimensional normal plane spanning
(∇F (z),v) (see Fig. 4a for details). The curvature along a tangent vector v can be expressed in terms of the Hessian matrix
HF of F [15]:
κ(z,v) =
vTHFv
‖v‖22‖∇F (z)‖2
. (1)
Principal directions correspond to the orthogonal directions in the tangent space maximizing the curvature κ(z,v). Specifically,
the l-th principal direction vl (and the corresponding principal curvature κl) is obtained by maximizing κ(z,v) with the constraint
vl ⊥ v1 . . .vl−1. Alternatively, the principal curvatures correspond to the nonzero eigenvalues of the matrix 1‖∇F (z)‖2PHFP ,
where P is the projection operator on the tangent space; i.e., P = I −∇F (z)∇F (z)T .
We now analyze the curvature of the decision boundary of deep neural networks in the vicinity of natural images. We consider
the LeNet and NiN [16] architectures trained on the CIFAR-10 task, and show the principal curvatures of the decision boundary,
in the vicinity of 1,000 randomly chosen images from the validation set. Specifically, for a given image x, the perturbed sample
z = x+ r(x) corresponds to the closest point to x on the decision boundary. We then compute the principal curvatures at
point z with Eq. 1. The average profile of the principal curvatures (over 1, 000 data points) is illustrated in Fig. 4b. Observe
that, for both networks, the large majority of principal curvatures are approximately zero: along these principal directions, the
decision boundary is almost flat. Along the remaining principal directions, the decision boundary has (non-negligible) positive
or negative curvature. Interestingly, the principal curvature profile is asymmetric towards negatively curved directions. This
property is not specific to the considered datapoints, the considered networks, or even the problem at hand (e.g., CIFAR-10). In
fact, this bias towards negatively curved directions is repeatable across a wide range of networks and datasets. In the next
section, we leverage this characteristic asymmetry of the decision boundaries of deep neural networks (in the vicinity of natural
images) in order to detect adversarial examples from clean examples.
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Fig. 4: (a) Normal section U of the decision boundary, along the plane spanned by the normal vector ∇F (z) and v. (b)
Principal curvatures for NiN and LeNet networks, computed at a point z on the decision boundary in the vicinity of a natural
image.
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Fig. 5: (a) Average of ρi(z) as a function of i for many different points z in the vicinity of natural images. (b) Basis of S.
While the above local analysis shows the existence of few directions along which the decision boundary is curved, we now
examine whether these directions are shared across different datapoints, and relate these directions with the robustness of deep
nets. To estimate the shared common curved directions, we compute the largest principal directions for a randomly chosen
batch of 100 training samples and merge these directions into a matrix M . We then estimate the common curved directions as
the m largest singular vectors of M that we denote by u1, . . . ,um. To assess whether the decision boundary is curved in such
directions, we then evaluate the curvature of the decision boundary in such directions for points z in the vicinity of unseen
samples from the validation set. That is, for x in the validation set, and z = x+r(x), we compute ρi(z) =
|uTi PHFPui|
E
v∼Sd−1
(|vTPHFPv|) ,
which measures how relatively curved is the decision boundary in direction ui, compared to random directions sampled from the
unit sphere in Rd. When ρi(z) 1, this indicates that ui constitutes a direction that significantly curves the decision boundary
at z. Fig. 5a shows the average of ρi(z) over 1,000 points z on the decision boundary in the vicinity of unseen natural images,
for the LeNet architecture on CIFAR-10. Note that the directions ui (with i sufficiently small) lead to universally curved
directions across unseen points. That is, the decision boundary is highly curved along such data-independent directions. Note
that, despite using a relatively small number of samples (i.e., 100 samples) to compute the shared directions , these generalize
well to unseen points. We illustrate in Fig. 5b these directions ui, along which decision boundary is universally curved in the
vicinity of natural images; interestingly, the first principal directions (i.e., directions along which the decision boundary is highly
curved) are very localized Gabor-like filters. Through discriminative training, the deep neural network has implicitly learned to
curve the decision boundary along such directions, and preserve a flat decision boundary along the orthogonal subspace.
Interestingly, the data-independent directions ui (where the decision boundary is highly curved) are also tightly connected
with the invariance of the classifier to perturbations. To elucidate this relation, we construct a subspace S = span(u1, . . . ,u200)
that contains the first 200 shared curved directions. Then, we show in Fig. 6 the accuracy of the CIFAR-10 LeNet model on a
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Fig. 6: Misclassification rate (% of images that
change labels) on the noisy validation set, with
respect to the noise magnitude (`2 norm of noise
divided by the typical norm of images).
LeNet NiN
Random 0.25 0.25
x2 − x1 0.10 0.09
∇x 0.22 0.24
Adversarial 0.64 0.60
TABLE I: Norm of projected perturbation
on S: ‖PSv‖2‖v‖2 . Larger values indicate that
perturbation belongs to subspace S.
noisy validation set, where the noise either belongs to S , or to S⊥ (i.e., orthogonal of S). It can be observed the deep network
is much more robust to noise orthogonal to S, than to noise in S. Hence, S also represents the subspace of perturbations to
which the classifier is highly vulnerable, while the classifier has learned to be invariant to perturbations in S⊥. To support this
claim, we report in Table I, the norm of the projection of adversarial perturbations (computed using the method in [17]) on the
subspace S , and compare it to that of the projection of random noise onto S . Note that for both networks under study, adversarial
perturbations project well onto the subspace S comparatively to random perturbations, which have a significant component in
S⊥. In contrast, note that perturbations obtained by taking the difference of two random images belong overwhelmingly to S⊥,
which agrees with the observation drawn in Sec. III whereby straight paths are likely to belong to the classification region.
Finally, note that the gradient of the image ∇x also does not have an important component in S, as the robustness to such
directions is fundamental to achieve invariance to small geometric deformations.1
The importance of the shared directions {ui}, where the decision boundary is curved hence goes beyond our curvature
analysis, and capture the modes of sensitivity learned by the deep network.
V. EXPLOITING THE ASYMMETRY TO DETECT PERTURBED SAMPLES
In this section, we leverage the asymmetry of the principal curvatures (illustrated in Fig. 4b), and propose a method to
distinguish between original images, and images perturbed with adversarial examples, as well as improve the robustness
of classifiers. For an element z on the decision boundary, denote by κ(z) = 1d−1
∑d−1
i=1 κi(z) the average of the principal
curvatures. For points z sampled in the vicinity of natural images, the profile of the principal curvature is asymmetric (see Fig.
4b), leading to a negative average curvature; i.e., κ(z) < 0. In contrast, if x is now perturbed with an adversarial example (that
is, we observe xpert = x+ r(x) instead of x), the average curvature at the vicinity of xpert is instead positive, as schematically
illustrated in Fig. 7. Table II supports this observation empirically with adversarial examples computed with the method in [17].
Note that for both networks, the asymmetry of the principal curvatures allows to distinguish very accurately original samples
from perturbed samples using the sign of the curvature. Based on this simple idea, we now derive an algorithm for detecting
adversarial perturbations.
Since the computation of all the principal curvatures is intractable for large-scale datasets, we now derive a tractable estimate
of the average curvature. Observe that the average curvature κ can be equivalently written as E
v∼Sd−1
(
vTG(z)v
)
, where
G(z) = ‖∇F (z)‖−12 (I −∇F (z)∇F (z)T )HF (z)(I −∇F (z)∇F (z)T ). In fact, we have
E
v∼Sd−1
(
vTG(z)v
)
= E
v∼Sd−1
(
vT
(
d−1∑
i=1
κiviv
T
i
)
v
)
=
1
d− 1
d−1∑
i=1
κi,
where vi denote the principal directions. It therefore follows that the average curvature κ can be efficiently estimated using a
sample estimate of E
v∼Sd−1
(
vTG(z)v
)
(and without requiring the full eigen-decomposition of G). To further make the approach
of detecting perturbed samples more practical, we approximate G(z) (for z on the decision boundary) with G(x), assuming
that x is sufficiently close to the decision boundary.2 This approximation avoids the computation of the closest point on the
decision boundary z, for each x.
We provide the details in Algorithm 2. Note that, in order to extend this approach to multiclass classification, an empirical
average is taken over the decision boundaries with respect to all other classes. Moreover, while we have used a threshold of 0
1In fact, a first order Taylor approximation of a translated image x(·+ τ1, ·+ τ2) ≈ x+ τ1∇xx+ τ2∇yx. To achieve robustness to translations, a deep
neural network hence needs to be locally invariant to perturbations along the gradient directions.
2The matrix G is never computed in practice, since only matrix vector multiplications of G are needed.
7x
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Fig. 7: Schematic representation of normal sections in the
vicinity of a natural image (top), and perturbed image (bottom).
The normal vector to the decision boundary is indicated with
an arrow.
LeNet NiN
% κ > 0 for original samples 97% 94%
% κ < 0 for perturbed samples 96% 93%
TABLE II: Percentage of points on the decision bound-
ary with positive (resp. negative) average curvature,
when sampled in the vicinity of natural images (resp.
perturbed images).
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Fig. 8: True positives (i.e., detection accuracy on clean samples) vs. False positives (i.e., detection error on perturbed samples).
Left: Results reported for GoogLeNet, CaffeNet and VGG-19 architectures, with perturbations computed using the approach in
[17]. Right: Results reported for GoogLeNet, where perturbations are scaled by a constant factor α = 1, 2, 5.
to detect adversarial examples from original data in the above explanation, a threshold parameter t is used in practice (which
controls the true positive vs. false positive tradeoff). Finally, it should be noted that in addition to detecting whether an image is
perturbed, the algorithm also provides an estimate of the original label when a perturbed sample is detected (the class leading
to the highest positive curvature is returned).
We now test the proposed approach on different networks trained on ImageNet, with adversarial examples computed using
the approach in [17]. The latter approach is used as it provides small and difficult to detect adversarial examples, as mentioned
in [18], [19]. Fig. 8 (left) shows the accuracy of the detection of Algorithm 2 on original images with respect to the detection
error on perturbed images, for varying values of the threshold t. For the three networks under test, the approach achieves very
accurate detection of adversarial examples (e.g., more than 95% accuracy on GoogLeNet with an optimal threshold). Note
first that the success of this strategy confirms the asymmetry of the curvature of the decision boundary on the more complex
setting of large-scale networks trained on ImageNet. Moreover, this simple curvature-based detection strategy outperforms the
detection approach recently proposed in [19]. In addition, unlike other approaches of detecting perturbed samples (or improving
the robustness), our approach only uses the characteristic geometry of the decision boundary of deep neural networks (i.e., the
curvature asymmetry), and does not involve any training/fine-tuning with perturbed samples, as commonly done.
The proposed approach not only distinguishes original from perturbed samples, but it also provides an estimate of the correct
label, in the case a perturbed sample is detected. Algorithm 2 correctly recovers the labels of perturbed samples with an
accuracy of 92%, 88% and 74% respectively for GoogLeNet, CaffeNet and VGG-19, with t = 0. This shows that the proposed
approach can be effectively used to denoise the perturbed samples, in addition to their detection.
Finally, we report in Fig. 8 (right) reports a similar graph to that of Fig. 8 (left) for the GoogLeNet architecture, but where
the perturbations are now multiplied by a factor α ≥ 1. Note that, as α increases, the accuracy of detection using of our method
decreases, as it heavily relies on local geometric properties of the classifier (i.e., the curvature). Interestingly enough, [19], [18]
report that the regime where perturbations are very small (like those produced by [17]) are the hardest to detect; we therefore
foresee that this geometric approach will be used along with other detection approaches, as it provides very accurate detection
in a distinct regime where traditional detectors do not work well (i.e., when the perturbations are very small).
VI. CONCLUSION
We analyzed in this paper the geometry induced by deep neural network classifiers in the input space. Specifically, we
provided empirical evidence showing that classification regions are connected. Next, to analyze the complexity of the functions
8Algorithm 2 Detecting and denoising perturbed samples.
1: input: classifier f , sample x, threshold t.
2: output: boolean perturbed, recovered label label.
3: Set Fi ← fi − fkˆ for i ∈ [L].
4: Draw iid samples v1, . . . ,vT from the uniform distribution on Sd−1.
5: Compute ρ ← 1
LT
L∑
i=1
i 6=kˆ(x)
T∑
j=1
vTj GFivj , where GFi denotes the Hessian of Fi projected on the tangent space; i.e.,
GFi(x) = ‖∇F (x)‖−12 (I −∇F (x)∇F (x)T )HFi(x)(I −∇F (x)∇F (x)T ).
6: if ρ < t then perturbed← false.
7: else perturbed← false and label← argmax
i∈{1,...,L}
i 6=kˆ(x)
∑T
j=1 v
T
j GFivj .
8: end if
learned by deep networks, we provided a comprehensive empirical analysis of the curvature of the decision boundaries. We
showed in particular that, in the vicinity of natural images, the decision boundaries learned by deep networks are flat along
most (but not all) directions, and that some curved directions are shared across datapoints. We finally leveraged a fundamental
observation on the asymmetry in the curvature of deep nets, and proposed an algorithm for detecting adversarially perturbed
samples from original samples. This geometric approach was shown to be very effective, when the perturbations are sufficiently
small, and that recovering the label was further possible using this algorithm. This shows that the study of the geometry of
state-of-the-art deep networks is not only key from an analysis (and understanding) perspective, but it can also lead to classifiers
with better properties.
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